Monday, December 12, 2011

Functional finance

Functional finance

Functional finance is an economic theory proposed by Abba P. Lerner, based on effective demand principle and chartalism.
It states that government should finance itself to meet explicit goals, such as taming the business cycle, achieving full employment, ensuring growth and low inflation.

Contents


Principles

The principal ideas behind functional finance can be summarised as:[1]
  • The principal economic objective of the state should be to ensure a prosperous economy.
  • Money is a creature of the state; it has to be managed.
  • Fiscal policy should be directed in the light of its impact on the economy, and the budget should be managed accordingly, that is, 'balance' is not important in itself.
  • The amount and pace of government spending should be set in the light of the desired level of activity, and taxes should be levied for their economic impact, rather than to raise revenue.
  • Principles of 'sound finance' apply to individuals. They make sense for households and businesses, but do not apply to the governments of sovereign states, capable of issuing money.

Rules for fiscal policy

Lerner postulated that government's fiscal policy should be governed by three rules:[1]
  • 1. There government shall maintain a reasonable level of demand at all times. If there is too little spending and, thus, excessive unemployment, the government shall reduce taxes or increase its own spending. If there is too much spending, the government shall prevent inflation by reducing its own expenditures or by increasing taxes.
  • 2. By borrowing money when it wishes to raise the rate of interest and by lending money or repaying debt when it wishes to lower the rate of interest, the government shall maintain that rate of interest that induces the optimum amount of investment.
  • 3. If either of the first two rules conflicts with principles of 'sound finance' or of balancing the budget, or of limiting the national debt, so much the worse for these principles. The government press shall print any money that may be needed to carry out rules 1 and 2.

History of use

Lerner's ideas were most heavily in use during the Post-World War II economic expansion, when they became basis for most textbook presentations of Keynesian economics and the basis for policy. Thus when Keynesian policy become under fire in the late 60's and early 70's it was Lerner's idea of functional finance most people were attacking.
Functional finance lost favor as basis of policy because empirically it did not seem to lead to the desired state of economy. Specifically, 3% initial target for unemployment and low inflation seemed mutually exclusive[citation needed]. Lerner's functional finance rules do not say what the non-inflation accelerating unemployment rate is or what should be done if both low levels of inflation and unemployment cannot be achieved.
Lerner recognized these problems and developed his theory of macroeconomics to allow for multiple equilibria and supply-side inflation[citation needed]. By then Keynesian economics had fallen out of favor.
Global financial concerns in 2010 that surround national debt, national and global aggregate demands, and proposed inconsistent applications of austerity and reduced government spending, on the one hand, and quantitative easing and increased government spending on the other hand, have made functional finance relevant again.
If unemployment is minimized rapidly by application of functional finance (modified to require green production of the material wants that prevents unacceptable environmental stress and/or financial inflation,) and its principles would in fact achieve freedom from want, Lerner will be one of the fathers of reforms suggested in the 20th Century that finds favor in the 21st.

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Edward J. Nell, Mathew Forstater, Reinventing functional finance: transformational growth and full employment, ISBN 1845422201, Edward Elgar Publishing 2003

External links

Sunday, December 11, 2011

A Theater of the Absurd Creates Global Collapse


A Theater of the Absurd Creates Global Collapse

Frederick C. Thayer
Early in September, President Clinton, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan finally decided to admit that the global economy seemed headed for a real crisis. Clinton called for a meeting within a month of the central bankers and finance ministers of the major industrial countries, shortly after Greenspan had announced that the demon of inflation had been driven to cover. The Fed seemed ready to reduce interest rates in an attempt to speed up economic activity and, perhaps, prevent the dragon of deflation from running wild. Greenspan’s hints implied that stimulating investment in new factories and equipment everywhere was an answer to the global problem, even though the US trade deficit was increasing as fewer manufactured goods were being sold aboard, and other countries could not sell their output.
By September 16, Rubin was telling Congress that too many American dollars had been invested in foreign countries, especially in Asia, and that many borrowers were unable to repay the loans. He did not admit that new firms can’t repay loans when they can’t sell what they produce, a condition known as overinvestment, overcapacity, and overproduction, but a condition economists declare impossible. I argue here that only large-scale public spending and deficits can help because the underlying principle of all-out competition must always make it impossible for producers to sell profitably all they produce. The global debacle is not just financial.
          The American economy cannot remain an island of prosperity in a collapsing world.
          Before proposing to act on the emerging crisis, President Clinton had visited Russia, discussing with Boris Yeltsin how the Russians might stabilize their sinking ship, designed and built by American economics professors who no longer wanted the credit. The Russian economy is not all that important relative to, say, Japan, but the Russian crisis was peaking as Clinton arrived. Yeltsin, using standard economic guidelines, said over and over that Russia needed "foreign investors" who might build factories and make goods that could be sold abroad and, perhaps, even to a few Russians who might be able to afford them. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was giving its standard advice and threats. It could not continue to help Russia and other countries if those governments did not stop deficit spending.
          Typically, deficits everywhere were paltry, as with the seven percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Russian deficit, but the IMF hates all deficits. Understandably, Yeltsin was nervous about using a Vietnam War-type strategy to starve people to death in order to "save" the economy. The same prescriptions also swept America. Peter Peterson, the Wall Streeter who runs the Concord Coalition’s attack on American deficits, has warned that "global financial crisis" and "genuine poverty among the elderly" are probably needed if we are to stop being so generous to Social Security recipients. Peterson’s "scorched earth" economics has earned him a Clinton appointment to the commission charged with "saving" Social Security.
          During Clinton’s Russian trip, the American stock market was going through one of those "significant corrections," with market indexes dizzily falling for a time. The stock market, after all, is the one part of the economy where big-time inflation is considered "good," no matter the underlying cause of rising share prices. Even when stocks are greatly overvalued, deflation is thought "bad" because it brings back memories of October 1929, when the market crash became wrongly identified as the cause of the Great Depression. Economic analysts said the falling stock prices showed that "economic crisis in Asia" finally was having some effect. The Europeans had earlier committed themselves to deficit-cutting as part of introducing a single currency and, despite what economics text books say deficit-cutting is always a prelude to economic downturns.
          Speaking in Russia, Clinton and Rubin proclaimed that "the fundamentals of the American economy are sound," echoing Herbert Hoover’s 1929 statement that "the fundamental business of the country, production and distribution, is on a sound and prosperous basis." Hoover had lots of company in 1929. Governor Franklin Roosevelt of New York, leading economist Irving Fisher of Yale, and the heads of the American Federation of Labor and General Motors said the same thing. Only a year or two later, almost everyone except economist came to agree that the growing depression had been caused by the global production of more consumer goods, food included, than could be sold to paying customers. Unacknowledged overcapacity and overproduction make 1998 somewhat similar to 1929. The American economy has been slowing down in 1998, and cannot remain an island of prosperity in a collapsing world. Even the recent American "good times" have been less than advertised: what is called "low unemployment" used to be "too high." Worse yet, American leaders have swallowed the old economic line that if the federal budget is balanced and if we begin to pay off some of the national debt, prosperity will continue forever. Once again, economists who refuse to acknowledge the causes of depressions are the designated "experts" assigned the task of preventing or ending them. Political leaders obey, and history is ignored.
                          Greenspan vs. History
                          Alan Greenspan said in June, only three months before admitting to the approaching crisis, that "the current expansion is as impressive as any I have witnessed in my near half-century of daily observation of the American economy." By referring only to the past 50 years, Greenspan could ignore the Great Depression of 1929-41 that ended only with the big deficits of World War II. The 50 postwar years have indeed been the most socially stable and economically prosperous in our history. Why is this more important than it appears to be?
                          This half-century is the first period of constant deficit spending, and the longest by far without a major depression. According to economic principle, this just cannot be true. Economists and today’s politicians across the board, especially such shouters as Ross Perot and the Concord Coalition of former politicians, insist that America must kill deficits and reduce the national debt (relatively speaking, only half of what it was in 1946). Both political parties, despite otherwise bitter struggles, jointly celebrate the new budget surplus. True to form, Greenspan has told Congress that "it is really quite pleasant to have this [growing budget surplus] confronting us… it is an issue of good choices [tax cut vs. debt paydown]." History says that the celebrants are fools. History says that the return to budget surpluses and debt paydowns will lead to major depression. World War II deficits brought recovery and didn’t hurt a bit. The postwar deficits deserve the credit for 50 years without another depression.
                          American crashes used to arrive very often, the first beginning in 1819, the most recent ending in 1941. On average a new one would begin only 17 years after the end of the one before it. Americans born in 1870 and still alive in 1941 had lived through the miseries of 1873-78, 1893-98, and the Great Depression. Some of those born in 1941 have experienced poverty and a number of relatively small recessions, but nothing like the big hurricanes and shorter but wild boom-and-bust cycles of earlier times.
                          In a previous article in Social Policy ("Do Balanced Budgets Cause Depressions?," Spring 1995), I pointed out that all six major depressions began after multi-year federal budget surpluses and big reductions in the national debt. Andrew Jackson is still praised for wiping out the debt as he left office in 1837, but the country fell into a six-year depression. Throughout the 1920s, surpluses steadily cut the national debt by 36 percent, but Herbert Hoover and fellow Republicans lost elections and took undeserved blame for the miseries of the 1930s. I say "underserved" because contrary to popular and even textbook history, Franklin Roosevelt was not a big spender in the 1930s. Nor was Ronald Reagan the great economizer of the 1980s.
                          Running for a second term in 1936, FDR promised to balance the budget, restated his determination to do so immediately after re-election, and resolutely slashed the next deficit to a paltry 0.1 percent of GDP. Even with 17 percent unemployment, he stuck to the traditional bipartisan dogma that deficits always hurt the economy, and surpluses always help. As soon as he balanced the budget, the economy collapsed again, wiping out the modest improvements of his first term. Only World War II, and deficits up to 31 percent of GDP, saved FDR’s place in history. His biggest peacetime deficit, 5.9 percent of GDP in 1934, was smaller than Ronald Reagan’s 6.3 percent in 1983. When Reagan did get around to cutting deficits in his second term, he was lucky enough to leave office before a recession swept George Bush out of the White House.
                          In the past half-century of relative stability, deficit-cutting relative to GDP has always hurt, as politicians have succumbed to an unconscious death wish to lose elections. Deficit cuts in the late 1950s led to the recession that helped John Kennedy win a close election in 1960. Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford cut deficits in 1971-74, and recession put Jimmy Carter in office. When Carter cut deficits, recession helped Reagan who, in turn, cut deficits and helped Bill Clinton. Harry Truman managed to defeat Thomas Dewey just before postwar deficit cuts caused the recession of 1949. In earlier times, major depressions were crucially important in the presidential elections of 1840, 1860, 1876, 1896 and, of course, 1932.
                          "Liberal" and "conservative" economists and politicians subscribe to economic principles that are at war with history or contradict each other, one by one. The principles are treated as holy writ, and even the most obvious questions are studiously avoided. Many of the principles are logically absurd. In political language, for example, a "free market" is nothing but anarchy, and it is foolish to believe that anarchy can move toward equilibrium, a basic economic belief. In pointing to obvious contradictions, I will quote chairman Greenspan not because he is unique, but because he is a widely accepted spokesperson for the economic consensus that crosses party lines. A well-known Republican, his views differ little from those of such Democratic Federal Reserve colleagues as Alice Rivlin and Alan Blinder.
                          This critique of contradictory and silly economic principles actually endorses Treasury Secretary Rubin’s recent but vague explanations of the global crisis. An "underweighting of risk factors by lenders" produced a lot of unrepayable loans and, of course, the overinvestment and overproduction that economists deny every time they complain of capital shortages that prevent still more investment. Greenspan blames the "borrowers" more than the lenders, akin to blaming middle-class Americans earning stagnant wages who are lured by endless advertising to "take our credit cards and buy out the store." Neither lenders nor borrowers should be faulted for believing the standard economic principle that the market for consumer goods is an infinite one. I begin with everyone’s favorite, "productivity."
                                      Productivity vs. Supply and Demand
                                      Greenspan told Congressional questioners in July that "labor productivity is really a measure of the aggregate output per unit of labor input… the standard of living of human beings is determined by the output per worker." Sermons about "productivity" and "efficiency" can be heard almost every day. Workers are told that if they produce more per hour, or more per day, they will earn higher wages, a promise made earlier in this century by management guru Frederick Taylor, and by Lenin when he made Taylor’s writings the centerpiece of Soviet industrial policy. All the promises and assertions were and are pretty silly.
                                      The productivity principle is at war with the ancient principle of supply and demand. If workers turn out more and more goods, the total supply keeps increasing, the market price of those goods must decline, and so must wages. The most typical and constant example is farming, the closest industry to a "perfect market." With the help of government research, farmers have greatly increased productivity over the years, only to reap surpluses that push prices below operating costs unless government helps. Only those unaffected by changes in supply and demand (the independently wealthy) enjoy higher living standards as productivity goes up and prices fall. The simplest but most profound aspect of economics remains unnoticed. Consumers are to be helped by providing them lower prices at the expense of workers and farmers. The "consumer interest" is considered a "public" interest, but the "worker/farmer interest" is a "special" interest, a concept that pits most Americans against themselves. The goal of "consumerism," the lowest prices, is best achieved in depression, when jobless workers cannot be consumers.
                                      To make matters worse, productivity is easily increased on paper by replacing workers with machinery. Tax breaks permit firms to write off machinery in a very few years, and many would prefer no write-off delays at all. Yet firms can write off worker expenses only one year at a time. The result is a form of fakery that badly distorts the productivity / profit relationship. The most basic contradiction of all, however, surrounds the ancient economic principle that an infinite increase in productivity and total output is not only possible, but a guaranteed road to prosperity and profits.
                                                  Say’s Law vs. Competition
                                                  Jean Baptiste Say’s 1802 "law" holds in its simplest form that "supply creates its own demand." Because individuals are thought to have an infinite desire to consume goods and services, there is an infinite total demand for such goods and services. And, because natural resources are infinite, or infinitely and easily substituted for, there is every reason to encourage maximum production and the fastest possible depletion of any natural resource in order to satisfy that presumably infinite global demand. There is an infinite need for jobs to produce the goods and services that people want and need. By definition, it is impossible to produce too many goods and services, it is impossible to suffer from exhaustion of any one resource, large-scale unemployment is impossible, and those who occasionally refer to "overproduction" or "overcapacity" are simply ignorant. Asked in July by one Congressman about "global overcapacity in manufacturing… and the seeds of a deflationary trend," Greenspan vaguely mentioned the possibility of deflation, but carefully avoided any mention of the "overcapacity" or "overproduction" that economic principles deny. Because economics is advertised as the "science of scarcity", the distinction between "scarcity" and "limits" is often lost. "Scarcity" refers only to the inability of an individual to satisfy his/her infinite desire to consume, but this has nothing to do with natural resource availability. Time is a scare resource for the very rich individual who can buy everything he would like to consume, but does not have enough time to do it. No matter how wealthy, the individual cannot eat more food than the body can accommodate, even if some try. In economics, "scarcity" and other principles relate only to individuals. Both governments and corporations are also treated as "individuals," but government is considered an alien who "distorts" the market by spending money on worthless projects and people. Many now suggest, however, that the supply of natural resources is by no means infinite. Whatever the amount of oil left to discover, for example, that amount is limited. Taking this as evidence of "scarcity," many look mistakenly to economics to solve a problem that economists do not acknowledge. The real killer for Say’s Law, however, is competition.
                                                  The principle of competition dictates that at the time of every purchase, each consumer must be able to choose among many producers of the good or service that the consumer wants to buy at that moment. The principle is that the greater the competition, the greater the duplication or redundancy of output, and the better the outcome for the consumer. At the time of each purchase, therefore, there must be a significant surplus of supply over demand and, when all potential consumers of all products are added together, there must be a truly significant surplus over demand in order to give consumers the many alternatives they should have. The entire system of anti-trust laws and court decisions is designed to prevent restrictions on competition, duplication of output, and plain old glut.
                                                  Say’s Law holds that supply cannot exceed demand. The principle of competition holds that supply must exceed demand. Economics fully supports both principles, but double-talks the contradiction. Followers have argued that Keynesian economics abolished Say’s Law, but this a false claim. In the early years of the Great Depression, politicians, business executives, and financiers agreed that overproduction caused it. Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt agreed with this long-accepted idea about the cause of depressions. Keynes merely invented the new term "underconsumption" that, at first glance, mistakenly appears the same as "overproduction."
                                                  "Depletion" and "overproduction" imply that there are infinite limits to what can be discovered, produced, sold and consumed, but "underconsumption" implies that no such limits are even possible. In both classical and Keynesian economics, the planet has infite resources and can accommodate an infinite number of automobiles and humans. Religious fundamentalists love economic principles because they give a scientific flavor to the dogma that it is evil to limit population growth. The Keynesians specify only that if supply does not automatically create demand, perhaps because consumers must save for a rainy day, government can stimulate enough demand to buy everything produced. In principle, there is never a need to regulate or restrain factory or farm output. The Keynesians succeeded in labeling "temporary shortfalls in aggregate demand" as the cause of depressions, recessions, and other downturns in the business cycle. By simply restating Say’s Law, Keynesianism allied itself with tradition by ignoring competition.
                                                  Competition of course, cancels out Say’s Law. When price supports and government purchases of surplus crops are ended, prices fall, farmers produce still more, prices fall still more, and farmers suffer, as is now the case. When global competition intensifies, producers in many countries vie with each other for shares of the available market. "Free trade" becomes everyone’s panacea, but every leader who advocates all-out global competition seeks an increase in his country’s exports to other lands, not an increase in imports. Every leader wants to sell surplus production abroad, not take in more and more of the surpluses of the other countries. Say’s Law of infinite demand is illogical, and competition proves as much by accelerating overproduction. The very purpose of competition is to produce much more than consumers can possibly buy and use.
                                                  What Hoover and Roosevelt learned the hard way is now forgotten. Greenspan and Congress demonstrated at the beginning of October that they don’t understand how competition works in this era of partly deregulated banking. When the New York Federal Reserve assembled a group of banks to bail out an unregulated hedge fund, Greenspan and a House committee agreed that some banks had made "bad" decisions to make "bad" loans. This is simply wrong; when many banks compete head-to-head to make loans or take deposits, each bank manager must try to make more loans and take more deposits than all the others. Loans are counted as assets, and banks make big and risky loans to businesses. The loans cannot be repaid when businesses collapse in the glutted market. A few years ago, many banks opened branches in Florida to welcome drug-dealing depositors then had to ask for amnesty when they were caught violating laws requiring them to report large deposits. All these bank managers do just what competition demands of them.
                                                  Competition cannot and does not provide the other benefits claimed for it. By drastically reducing profits as competitors struggle against each other, competition provides too little money for research. Before the break-up of AT&T, Bell Laboratories was far and away the most innovative research organization in the country, and the Western Electric subsidiary invented the quality control concepts that we now label Total Quality Management. Americans credit such things to Japan, but this country gave them to Japan as a part of the Cold War foreign policy. Government now permits high-tech companies to do collective research instead of keeping secrets from each other and slowing progress, an exemption from antitrust laws that purists would label "collusion" or "conspiracy." The primary cause of bankruptcies, the very epitome of waste, is competitive proliferation, redundancy, and glut. According to economic theory, of course, only government produces waste; everything produced in the private sector is officially labeled "wealth."
                                                              The "Wealth vs. Waste" Circus
                                                              The most gruesome examples of our national accounting system, based as it is upon fundamental economic principles, are military hardware, nuclear technology, and biochemical products. If government buys a fighter plane for the Air Force, the airplane is considered "waste" because it will not be sold in the marketplace and, therefore has no market value. While all the parts that go into the plane are part of the GDP, the plane as a whole is not. If government helps industry by approving the sale of fighter planes to other countries, however, this is normal marketplace behavior, and the planes do indeed have market value. Thus, the planes bought for the Air Force are "waste," but those sold to Taiwan are "wealth." Even the economic bookkeeping system, sad to say, pushes firms to sell weapons, nuclear technology, and biochemical agents anywhere in the world. Arms races, nuclear proliferation, and the spread of "weapons of mass destruction" are simply by-products of global competition and absurd economic concepts.
                                                              Global markets are not a phenomenon of any one ideology, and it is a mistake to believe that competition is capitalist in origin. Nations must compete against each other in their efforts to sell export products abroad, and subsidies and cheap labor are always in order. The Chinese still preach a Marxist gospel from time to time, but they create cheap prison labor in order to attract foreign investment in new factories. As prisoners, workers lose their socialist "rights" as "owners of the means of production," and the Chinese easily combine socialist dogma with slavery.
                                                              At a less ugly level, a brewery is considered "wealth" because it is supposedly worth at least the cost of building it. In principle, the brewer can easily sell all his beer. The money borrowed to build the brewery is backed by the brewery as a form of collateral, and the brewery and all its equipment are officially counted as "investment." If government builds a bridge that the brewery cannot do without, however, the bridge is considered "waste" because it will not be sold. If government borrows to build the bridge, the money is considered worthless because the bridge has no economic value. True enough, many people casually speak of "needed investment in public works," but the fact remains that public works are not counted as investments.
                                                              Using this logic, all public spending can be labeled as "waste" that takes money away from where it is needed "new factories and equipment" and puts it into such "worthless" expenditures as public works and social programs. If potential criminals were provided jobs so that they could learn to lead normal lives, a sensible economic theory would label this a necessary and official investment in the national quality of life, but since this is not a marketable commodity, all such programs are thought to be "waste" that should be removed from the federal budget. Indeed, government has even made itself the hostage of standard economic claptrap by using a policy of compulsory unemployment to violate its own laws, and then trying to deny that it wants to keep people out of work. Bill Clinton may have lied about his sex life, but everyone lies about unemployment.
                                                                                                                                          "Everyone Must Work" vs. Compulsory Unemployment
                                                              John Kennedy’s council of Economic Advisers invented the concept of a Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) in the early 1960s (they called it "target unemployment rate" to give official recognition to something economist have always preached. A significant amount of joblessness is needed, they say, if there is to be room in the economy to create new jobs and increase economic growth. After all, if everyone had good jobs, it would be impossible to start new businesses without paying very high wages to bribe workers away from their current employers. The high wages would then drive wages up, the economy would "overheat", and we would have runaway inflation. To prevent inflation, therefore, millions of active job-seekers must be kept out of work so that those who have jobs will dare not ask for wage increases. Marx correctly pointed to a "reserve army of the unemployed," but he was wrong to label it a part of capitalism instead of normal national and global competition.
                                                              "Welfare reform" was a hot issue in 1994, the year that Bill Clinton’s chief economist wrote in The New York Times that an unemployment rate between 5.9 and 6.3 percent was needed to control inflation. Unemployment has dropped since then, and Clinton’s advisers now talk about something around 5.0 percent as the desirable rate. The last time Congress announced a desirable minimum jobless rate was the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, and the rate was 4.0 percent. Every year since then, White House economists and the Federal Reserve chair have had to publicly explain why government takes no action to hit that 4.0 percent target. Yearly economic reports and Federal Reserve appearances before Congress always involve double-talk about why Humphrey-Hawkins must be forgotten because 4.0 percent unemployment would cause inflation.
                                                              So it was that Greenspan trooped up Congressional Hill in July to outline how the Fed was always alert to signs of potential inflation. "Should pressure on labor resources begin to show through more impressively in cost increases," he declared, "policy action may need to counter any associated tendency for prices to accelerate." If more people had jobs, he hinted, the Fed would raise interest rates to slow job creation. As the questioning continued into the following day, one Congressman asked Greenspan to verify that a recent increase in the minimum wage had not caused employees to get rid of people they could not afford to pay. Greenspan disagreed, asserting that the increase did indeed have a "negative effect" on jobs, but the decline had been "overwhelmed by far stronger forces." He insisted that if the minimum wage had not been increased, more people probably would have found jobs.
                                                              Locked into another theoretical blind alley, Greenspan was arguing that minimum wage increases are "bad" because they force employers to get rid of workers… But he also was arguing that it would be "good" if his own interest rate hikes caused unemployment by "cooling" the economy. When Greenspan and many others talk about minimum wages, they pose as advocates of putting as many people to work as possible but, when they talk about inflation, they vaguely talk about their policy of compulsory unemployment. As I pointed out before, ("The Comic Opera of Welfare Reform," Social Policy, Summer, 1995), those who now force everyone on welfare to find jobs also keep people out of work to keep wages down. They know very well that many being forced off welfare rolls will not find jobs. The standard technique is to support full employment while whispering about the anti-inflation job-killing NAIRU policy.
                                                                          Protectionism vs. Free Trade
                                                                          Professors of economics at leading universities make more and louder speeches about the "evils of protectionism" than any other group. Without exception, they truly have lifetime employment at their universities. Professors even managed to get legislation enacted that now prevents universities from forcing them to retire at age 70, or at any other age, a law that has crippled the abilities of universities to plan ahead. Professors love to "protect" their own job security, but they hate legislation that "protects" others. This is especially the case for "liberals" who see antitrust laws and all-out competition as the one best way to guard against monopoly power. "Consumerists" such as Ralph Nader do not believe the public interest is being served unless bankruptcies occur, because this is the only way to "know" that businesses are really fighting each other. Yet the consumerists also fight mergers because they believe that every firm is still needed, a wholly contradictory stance. Without realizing as much, consumerists fall into the old trap of helping consumers at the expense of workers.
                                                                          The most unusual form of "protectionism" was World War II itself, the first conflict to destroy much of the world’s industrial plant. While nobody thought of it that way, this country was the only industrial giant to escape major damage. For years afterward, American companies dominated markets because competitors had been wiped out. This is how the most stable period of our economic history began, with people holding secure jobs for a few decades. The simple lesson we should have learned, but did not, was that economic stability brings social stability, a 30-year mortgage being the best indicator of both. Today, our secure academics and many politicians gleefully tell Americans that they will have at least seven different employers during a working lifetime, keeping quiet about how long it will take to find a new job after losing one. In all-out competition, many become "losers," and not necessarily for only a week or two.
                                                                          To this day, the Smoot-Hawley tariff of mid-1930 is blamed for "causing" the Great Depression that actually began in August of 1929. The deeper, typically incorrect, explanation, of course, is that the tariff made the depression longer and deeper but, early in 1930, perhaps the most expert observer of all had it right. Financier Bernard Baruch, who advised many presidents and had organized industrial contributions to World War I, pointed to "a worldwide crisis of overproduction," asking that a worldwide "supreme court of business" must assemble to regulate the glut.
                                                                          Franklin Roosevelt’s timid New Deal was designed to attack glut, but it was too mild to take on a task it could not accomplish, and the Supreme Court abolished it as blasphemous. Tariffs and New Deal structures are by no means the best way to deal with global overproduction, but they do begin with valid definitions of the problem. Those who preach economic gospel simply refuse to consider overproduction, resource limits, and human overpopulation as even remotely possible.
                                                                          Economists and the politicians trapped in their dogma can always be counted upon to preach "free trade" as the answer to everything. Actually, everyone sees global openness as the way to export the goods that cannot be sold at home, the root cause of the imperialistic expansions of the late 19th century. Americans should ask themselves why we sent the Navy into Tokyo Bay, before the Civil War, to convince the Japanese that they should "open" themselves to free trade. Obviously, every country cannot export more than it imports, but that is every country’s objective in a "free trade" regime.
                                                                                      Government and Money
                                                                                      Economic thinking is still mired in gold standard principles. The money with which government buys things is thought worthless because government buys worthless goods. The historic solution was to require that government tie the money in circulation to the amount of gold or silver (any commodity would do) on hand. Taking on unsecured debt would simply flood the country with still more worthless money, "monetizing the debt" and causing inflation. Thankfully, we now live in a world of fiat money, an ugly label for a wonderful system still hampered by gold standard thinking.
                                                                                      Government now creates money and puts it into the global economy by spending it. Government must spend at least as much as it takes in if those who pay taxes will be able to pay them. Basically, monetary policy should be understood as logically driven by the need to pay taxes. If goverment spends less than it takes in, those who owe taxes will have to liquidate holdings and take losses in order to pay, a depression-type activity. The same problem exists for those across the world who must repay any of their debts in dollars. The ability to pay taxes rests upon deficit spending. Along with many others, Greenspan often claims that government deficits push up interest rates, another leftover from gold standard days. In so arguing, he chooses to forget that he constantly raises and lowers interest rates according to his interpretation of what is needed. If he raises rates as deficits increase, and if the deficits are the actual cause of inflation, why does he raise the rates if it is a useless action? These are important questions because higher interest rates cause inflation by increasing the cost of doing business.
                                                                                      Government spending cannot damage the economy by "crowding out" (factories) by putting money into "worthless" government functions, sometimes labeled "necessary but wasteful," as in the case of the military. With fiat money, there cannot be a shortage of savings available for new investment. The capital is created when it is needed because savings are the accounting record of investment. Economists, including Keynes, have erroneously denied the possibility of "overinvestment" along with overproduction, but they are twins. A "low savings rate" indicates that deposits have been moved from banks into the stock market to take advantage of inflated share prices. A "low savings rate" may also indicate that in a world of glut, there is little need for immediate new investment in factories and equipment.
                                                                                      Only government spending can safely solve the problems of recessions and depressions. Because all government spending is, by definition, meeting some of the needs of society as a whole, \all government spending should be officially considered an investment in the nation’s future. Those who would list only spending on capital goods as investment fall short in their analysis. The health of citizens, for example, is as important as bridges.
                                                                                      When government is customer, it promises to buy what it orders people to produce, a stabilizing factor that cannot exist in a free market. While the IMF and others still do not accept the notion that government deficit spending can halt economic downturns, there is less hesitation than there used to be. The problem is that there used to be. The problem is that recessions cannot be clearly seen until a year or more after they begin. And, if deficits can end depressions and recessions, they can prevent them as well. The evidence of history shows that when deficits end recessions, but are then cut back during a recovery, the stage is set for the next downturn. Deficits should not be used only as overdue "jumpstarting," but are constantly needed as stabilizers. The "business cycle" is not an Act of God beyond human control, but only another by-product of theoretical economic nonsense.
                                                                                      Every part of the public economy, with perhaps the partial exception of the military, has been starved for years. Roads, bridges, and schools are national disgraces, and the complete list is far too long to include here. Taking money out of the military and putting it into other programs helps not at all with respect to the list of deficiencies, especially when there is no economic reason whatsoever for refusing to meet such needs. The old, the disable, the poor, the mentally ill, and even the young are targets of economic concepts that push leaders into condemning single parents for taking care of children instead of walking factory-to-factory looking for jobs. If "welfare reform" is a comic opera, our dominant economic concepts are a long-running theater of the absurd. Ignoring the cause of 50 years without a depression, we now resolutely move once again to create another great collapse.

Think big deficits cause recessions?


Think big deficits cause recessions?
Think again!


The chairman of the Republican National Committee predicts that a recession is on the way, blaming the usual suspects - deficits, regulations and taxes. His prediction is probably correct, but his reasoning is not. The culprit is very probably the recent reductions in the federal deficit as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. The record of history is totally at odds with economic principles and textbooks.
The annual deficit (spending minus revenues) has dropped from 4.9 to 2.3 percent of GDP since 1992.
This is the same pattern that immediately preceded the recession of 1990-91 that became a campaign issue in 1992.
The "recovery" that had begun in 1991 was not all that evident by mid-1992. Indeed, the beginning and end of "official" recessions can only be identified long after the fact.
Technically, recession occurs when the economy experiences negative economic growth for two quarters (six months). It then takes some time for the National Bureau of Economic Research to collect data and announce the beginning or end, a process that can take a year or more. If recession begins this year, we will know for sure only well into 1997, but the immediate effects will be quite visible.
I am not an economic forecaster, but I have uncovered unusual relationships that connect reductions in the national debt with major economic depressions, rising annual deficits with economic growth, and reduced annual deficits with economic contraction and recessions.
The record of history is clear and wholly consistent. Increases in the national debt and annual deficits never have harmed the economy, always have helped it. Significant reductions in the debt and the deficits never have helped, always have hurt. The record divides itself into two periods.
From the origins to World War II
In its first 150 years, the government periodically undertook systematic multi-year reductions in the national debt by taking in more revenues than it spent.
Each of six such sustained periods led to one of the six major depressions in our history. The last three of these crashes were the truly significant depressions of the industrial era.
This is the record:
1. 1817-21: In five years, the national debt was reduced by 29 percent, to $90 million. A depression began in 1819.
2. 1823-36: In 14 years, the debt was reduced by 99.7 percent, to $38,000. A depression began in 1837.
3. 1852-57: In six years, the debt was reduced by 59 percent, to $28.7 million. A depression began in 1857..
4. 1867-73: In seven years, the debt was reduced by 27 percent, to $2.2 billion. A depression began in 1873.
5. 1880-93: In 14 years, the debt was reduced by 57 percent, to $1 billion. A depression began in 1893.
6. 1920-30: In 11 years, the debt was reduced by 36 percent, to $16.2 billion. A depression began in 1929.
There have been no such multiyear budget surpluses and debt reductions since World War II and, significantly, no major new depression. The record suggests that reducing the debt never sustained prosperity, even when the debt was virtually wiped out by 1836. The highest deficits were those of world War II, ranging from 20 to 31 percent of Gross National Product. For a few years following the war, the debt was greater than GNP, the only such case in history. The wartime borrowing and spending actually ended the Great Depression.
Post-World War II
Both political parties pledge to balance the budget by 2002, and all budget-balancers hope ultimately to reduce the national debt. In the meantime, the nine recessions of the depression-free postwar decades have each followed reductions in the annual deficits relative to GDP.
Using data developed by Warren B. Mosler, economic analyst for a Florida investment firm, I suggest how some of the recent recessions have been politically significant:
·
· Deficit reductions, 1977-80, gave way to a recession in 1980 that damaged Jimmy Carter’s re-election hopes.
· Deficit reductions, 1987-89, were followed by the 1990-91 recession that harmed George Bush.
Meanwhile, the longest period without a recession was from November, 1982 to July, 1990.
The Republicans who now praise that "Reagan boom" never refer to the deficits or blame the Democratic Congress, while Democrats repeatedly attack "Reagan deficits." Neither side seems aware that a steep rise in deficits began in 1981, preceding the "boom" by almost two years.
When deficit reductions finally began in 1987, they paved the way for the next recession. Political irony is everywhere.
When the economy slides downhill, the incumbent president is badly damaged, and it does him little good to proclaim "success" in reducing deficits.
Ronald Reagan suffered no political harm because of the deficits of the 1980s and, even at his advanced age, might have been elected again in 1988 if he had been permitted to run. Whatever citizens say to pollsters, they vote against recessions, not budget deficits.
Driven by what appears to be wholly fallacious economic principles, politicians have put together such monstrosities as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollins deficit-reduction policy and the more recent "zero-sum budgeting" (all new programs must be financed by cuts in existing programs), along with the Clinton administration’s "reinvention of government" ("downsizing") to virtually guarantee a new economic disaster, perhaps more serious than any in recent decades.
Extreme danger ahead?
Europe as a whole has been in deep economic trouble for some time, and even Germany now has 11 percent unemployment.
Following the Maastricht criteria the prerequisites for monetary union, European countries are attempting to reduce their annual deficits to the less than 3 percent levels required by the treaty.
There is reason to believe that this effort is hurting European economies which, along with Japan and this country, cannot sell as many consumer goods and services as they need and wish to sell. A spreading recession virus could be very dangerous indeed.
The relationships outlined above deserve serious study, even if they are wholly foreign to widely accepted economic principle that blind even sophisticated analysts to such possibilities. It may be time to question what has been considered unquestionable principle
Deficit reductions, 1971-74, led to the recession that began at the end of 1973; a slow recovery did not help Gerald Ford in 1976.
.

BY
FREDERICK C. THAYER

Full Employment AND Price Stability

Full Employment AND Price Stability


"... one wants to explain the empirical fact that involuntary unemployment is only associated with money-using contractual economies. In other words, real economies that do not use money and money labor contracts to organize production (e.g., feudalism, slave economies, South Sea Islanders discovered by Margaret Meed, etc) may possess important nonlinearities and even an uncertain future -- but there is never an important involuntary unemployment problem. Slaves are always fully employed as well as are serfs in feudalism.......Finally it should be noted that herds of animals, schools of fish, etc organize together to solve the economic problems of What? How? For Whom? Without using money, contracts or markets, these animals still face complex nonlinear problems in their search for food and interaction with other herds. Yet animals never suffer from involuntary unemployment!.
Professor Paul Davidson University of Tennessee
(PKT Archives)

Introduction


The current monetary system can sustain both full employment and price stability over the short and long run. It will be shown that:
1) Unemployment equates to the Federal budget deficit being too small, and
2) The value of a currency is determined by the prices paid by that government.
The government has embraced two primary economic objectives: price stability and full employment. Ironically, it has chosen a monetary and fiscal policy that utilizes excess capacity, including unemployment, to maintain price stability, obviating the possibility of simultaneous achievement of both objectives. The focus of this analysis is on an entirely different option in which the government assumes the role of employer of last resort (ELR), eliminating involuntary unemployment, and price stability is maintained by the government restraining the price it pays for the proposed supplementary ELR labor pool.
The Employer of Last Resort (ELR) Alternative
The U.S. Government can proceed directly to zero unemployment by offering a public service job to anyone who wants one as a supplement to the current budget. Furthermore, by fixing the wage paid under this ELR program at a level that does not disrupt existing labor markets, i.e., a wage level close to the existing minimum wage, substantive price stability can be expected.
The ELR program allows for the elimination of many existing government welfare payments for anyone not specifically targeted for exemption, as desired by the electorate. Minimum wage legislation would no longer be needed. Labor would welcome the safety net of a guaranteed job, and business would recognize the benefit of a pool of available labor it could draw from at some spread to the government wage paid to ELR employees. Additionally, the guaranteed public service job would be a counter- cyclical influence, automatically increasing government employment and spending as jobs were lost in the private sector, and decreasing government jobs and spending as the private sector expanded.
This ELR proposal at one level resembles workfare, which has been rejected by Congress, though some state welfare reform programs are not unlike workfare. However, unlike this ELR proposal, the state programs may be serving to create a new class of sub-minimum wage employees who are replacing regular public employees.
The ELR proposal also has characteristics similar to the current Federal unemployment compensation policy. There are, however, significant differences as unemployment is 1) compensation is payment for not working, 2) temporary, 3) does not cover everyone, and, 4) is less than the proposed ELR wage.
In addition to zero unemployment, it will be shown that this ELR policy establishes price stability not entirely unlike many proposed income policies have been designed to do. However, an ELR program would, nonetheless, face stiff opposition as it allows the federal budget deficit to float, with a high probability of permanent and growing deficits. For example, using rough estimates, if the government employed 8 million new public servants at, say, $12,500 per year, that would be a new expense of $100 billion. Subtract from this some portion of approximately $50 billion currently spent on unemployment compensation, $15 billion spent on AFDC, and over $20 billion spent on food stamps that may be reduced, and the net may be an additional $50 billion of annual deficit spending. Therefore, this study will first focus on why the fear of deficits per se is unwarranted.

Taxing, Spending, and Borrowing with a Non-Convertible Currency


The U.S. dollar is not legally convertible into anything by the government on demand. It is, however, designated by the government as the only means of discharging federal tax liabilities. Tax liabilities are an ongoing debt the private sector owes the government, and they create a continuous need for dollars. The private sector obtains the needed dollars primarily as payment for the transfer of real goods and services to the government, and it is government spending or lending that provides the dollars needed to pay taxes. For purposes of this analysis, government spending includes spending by the government or any of its agents. For example, when the central bank buys foreign currency, it is the same, for cash flow analysis, as the treasury buying military equipment. This is commonly referred to as viewing the treasury and central bank on a consolidated basis.
The imperative of taxation is to create sellers of real goods and services willing to exchange them for the unit of account selected by the government. Dollar denominated tax liabilities function to create sellers of real goods and services who must have dollars to extinguish their tax liabilities. Raising revenue, per se, is of no consequence to the government, as dollars are not a limited government resource, but a liability, or tax credit, that can be issued at will. The government's ability to raise revenue does not limit what it is able to purchase. The purchasing power of the government is limited only by what is offered for sale in exchange for dollars.
Adam Smith (page 312, Cannan Edition) recognized this Chartalist view:
"A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper money; even though the term of its final discharge and redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince."
Cannan's summary of this paragraph reads:
"A requirement that certain taxes should be paid in particular paper money might give that paper a certain value even if it was irredeemable."
This was also well understood by British colonial governors:
"In those parts of Africa where land was still in African hands, colonial governments forced Africans to produce cash-crops no matter how low the prices were. The favorite technique was taxation. Money taxes were introduced on numerous items: cattle, land, houses, and the people themselves. Money to pay taxes was got by growing cash crops or working on European farms or in their mines." (Rodney, 1972, page 165, original emphasis)
In his Treatise on Money, volume 1, page 4, John Maynard Keynes wrote "...and in addition the State claims the right what thing corresponds to that which discharges obligations."
There is little evidence that this once common understanding of non-convertible money has survived the era of convertible commodity money.

Treasury Securities and Interest Rate Maintenance

In the commercial banking system loans create deposits as an accounting entry. Commercial bank reserve accounts at the Fed can be thought of as non-interest bearing checking accounts at the Fed, and reserve requirements can be thought of as minimum balance requirements. Reserve balances are assets of the member bank, and bank liabilities are assets of the Fed.
The consolidated ledger for the entire banking system is always in balance, with the exception of a few operating factors, such as checks in the process of clearing. When any bank transfers money to another bank, the first bank's deposits are reduced and the second bank's deposits are increased. Total deposits in the commercial banking system remain unchanged:



Bank A and Bank B are in balance. They have each originated 100 in loans and credited the proceeds to the borrower's checking account.



Bank A has lost its deposit to Bank B. The banking system in aggregate is still in balance, though Bank A's reserve account at the Fed is overdrawn by 100 and Bank B's reserve account has a positive balance of 100. In this case, Bank A can borrow from Bank B. It is possible to restore balance without intervention by the Fed.
If, however, commercial bank A's depositor writes a check to the U.S. Treasury payment of taxes, the Fed debits the reserve account of Bank A and credits the Treasury's account at the Fed. Total bank deposits in the commercial banking system are reduced while total loans remain unchanged:



Bank A and Bank B are in balance. They have each originated 100 in loans and credited the proceeds to the borrower's checking account.



Bank A's depositor has made a payment to the Treasury's account at the Federal Reserve. The Fed debits the reserve account of Bank A, and credits the Treasury's account at the Fed. The banking system now has an overdraft at the Fed, known as a reserve deficiency, of 100. In this case, Bank A's reserve account is overdrawn. If Bank A borrows from Bank B, the deficiency moves to Bank B and Bank B's reserve account is overdrawn. If either bank originates a new loan and creates a new deposit, assets and liabilities will increase equally, leaving the size of the deficiency unchanged. Nor will repayment of existing loans modify the deficiency.
For all practical purposes, a system wide deficiency in the commercial banking system can only be alleviated by a transfer of funds from the Fed to the reserve account of a member commercial bank. When the Fed credits a member bank's reserve account and debits its own account, total reserves in the commercial banking system are increased. In this simple case, if the Federal Reserve loans 100 back to Bank A, the banking system regains balance. Beginning with the deficiency condition:



The Fed replaces an overdraft with a loan:



Even if Bank A did not cover the deficiency, the Fed will book the overdraft as a loan and charge an appropriate penalty. In that way, a deficiency is always covered by a loan from the Fed. The variable is the rate, and possibly the collateral demanded by the Fed to secure the mandatory loan.
Should government spending exceed tax receipts, there is a budget deficit as defined for accounting purposes. Government spending is generally done via a credit to a commercial bank's reserve account at the Fed, and an offsetting debit of the Treasury's account at the Fed. The credit to the member bank's reserve account is all that affects the private sector, as any offsetting transactions between the Fed and the Treasury's account at the Fed are entirely outside the commercial banking system, and are offsetting entries on the government's consolidated balance sheet of the Treasury and the Fed.
Let us assume the commercial banking system is in balance with all banks satisfied with their current reserve balances as in figure 4:



A 100 payment from the Treasury to Bank B's customer is facilitated by the Fed debiting the Treasury's Fed account and crediting Bank B's reserve account:



Assuming for simplicity there are no reserve requirements, this creates an imbalance in the commercial banking system known as a system wide reserve excess. Since reserve accounts are not interest bearing, a bank with a reserve excess will attempt to loan those funds to another bank. With no other banks in deficit at the Fed, the overnight rate, known as the fed funds rate, would fall to 0 bid. Banks would be unwilling to pay interest to attract overnight deposits that don't earn interest.
Excess reserves do have value if they can be utilized to repay loans from the Fed, to purchase new Treasury securities from the Treasury, or to purchasing existing Treasury securities from the Fed's current portfolio. All of these constitute the transfer of funds to the Fed. Only a transfer of funds from the commercial banking system to the Fed can diminish a reserve excess.
Purchases and sales of securities by the Fed are called open market operations. The normal operating procedure is for the Fed to offset factors that cause reserve imbalances, called operating factors, with open market operations. Operating factors include any transfers between commercial banks and the Fed, and other items that effect reserve balance including changes in uncleared checks, known as "float", and changes in cash in circulation.
The sale of newly issued government securities by Treasury affects the private sector in exactly the same way as the sale of securities by the Fed from its portfolio of existing government securities. In either case, funds held by the private sector are transferred to the Fed, the government securities are credited to a member bank's account, and a reserve drain equal to the proceeds of the securities sale results.
Beginning with a reserve excess of 100:



The Fed sells 100 Treasury securities to Bank B:



Now, Bank B is willing to pay interest to keep its deposits as it has 100 of interest bearing loans and 100 of interest bearing Treasury securities to fund.
A system wide reserve excess or shortage can only be offset by transfers of funds to and from the Fed. If the government wishes to maintain an interest rate between "0 bid", the condition coincident with a reserve excess, and "no offers", the result of a reserve deficiency, it must offset operating factors that cause these conditions. Some form of interest bearing deposits, such as Treasury securities, must be offered in the case of a reserve excess. Funds are loaned, either directly (including overdrafts) or via open market purchases of securities, in the case of a reserve deficiency.
The Fed requires member banks to maintain minimum reserve balances known as required reserves. These do not pay interest, and therefore reserve requirements constitute a bank tax equal to the rate of interest banks must pay the Fed to borrow the required reserves, or, from another point of view, the interest foregone by leaving money in non-interest bearing reserve accounts. Currently the Fed enforces certain minimum reserve requirements. A reserve excess or deficiency is defined as the banks having either an excess of reserves above the required level or a reserve total that is below the required level.
Technically, the concept of the Fed being the only source of net reserves follows directly from a lag reserve accounting system wherein reserve requirements are based on deposits from a previous time period. Since reserve requirements are determined by a deposit count from a previous time period, and reserve accounts do not pay interest, demand for reserves is inelastic. Increasing or decreasing loans, and thereby deposits, for example, does change future reserve requirements, but cannot alleviate a current imbalance.
Even with a lead system, as the U.S. had in the 1960's, practical considerations of short term inelasticities of bank loan portfolios result in the same Fed policy of acting only defensively in the money markets (Basil Moore, Horizontalists and Verticalists, 1988). In other words, the Fed can only react to imbalances by offsetting them. The Fed does not have the option to act proactively to add or drain reserves to directly alter the monetary base unless it is prepared to accept either a 0 bid interest rate, or an interest rate coincident with a reserve deficiency at one or more member banks. However, as a reserve deficiency is automatically booked as a loan, the Fed's only real option is to set the price its loan of needed reserves to the commercial banking system. This is the basis of the concept of endogenous money, the major theme of Post Keynesian monetary thought. (Pkmt survey, Cottrell, pkt archives)
Treasury securities, therefore, function not to fund expenditures, but to provide an interest bearing deposit for non-interest bearing excess reserve deposits. The sale of Treasury securities supports the overnight interest rate determined exogenously by the Fed. Deficit spending without security sales from the Treasury or the Fed would create a reserve excess and result in a "0 bid" for overnight deposits. The economic difference between the government issuing securities and not issuing securities is the economic difference between a '0 bid" short term interest rate and some positive short-term rate of interest. Consequently, the offering of government debt to the private sector coincident with deficit spending is a necessary condition for the government to maintain a positive overnight interest rate.
The same logic applies to the physical printing of money. If currency is printed and spent by the government in excess of the private sector's desire to hold cash, the holders of this excess cash will be unable to find any interest paying depositories for their cash if the government does not sell securities or offer other interest bearing deposits. A "0 bid" short-term interest rate would prevail.
Without the understanding that the dollars used to purchase government securities would otherwise reside overnight in non-interest bearing reserve accounts, fears such as 'roll over risk' (problems relating to possibility of the government issuing new bonds to replace maturing bonds, and not finding any borrowers) and financial 'crowding out' (the notion that sales of government bonds use up money that would have been available for other borrowers) can surface and block fiscal policy options that include increased deficit spending.
Exogenous Pricing: A Basic Case of Monopoly
The current monetary system is a classic monopoly with the traditional analysis of monopoly sufficient to describe all aspects. The government is the monopoly issuer of the dollars needed by the private sector to pay taxes. Spending by the Treasury and spending by the Fed when it performs offsetting open market operations, as well as direct lending by the Fed supply the private sector with the needed dollars. In all cases, the private sector exchanges assets, goods, or services to the govt., the monopoly supplier, in exchange for dollars ultimately needed for payment of taxes.
The government has the same pricing options with its money of any monopoly supplier of an absolute necessity. An analogy can be drawn, for example, with an electric utility monopoly although taxes give the currency monopolist a tool to regulate demand that the electric utility monopolist does not have.
How does the monopolist price his product? There are two options:
  1. Set price, p, and let quantity, q, float, or
  2. Set q and let p float.
The first option is generally preferred, with a gold standard or the proposed ELR program two examples of using the first option.
However, the government is currently employing the second option. It sets a budget that determines q (spending), and lets the market determine p (price level) as all purchases are made at market prices. If the monopolist decides to set q, and let the market decide p, it must constrain q so that demand exceeds q, or, for all practical purposes, the price of its product will fall towards 0. Government constraint of q to control p means using continuous unemployment and excess capacity to maintain price stability. Surely this would never be considered a viable option in running an electric utility monopoly, for example.
A gold standard uses the monopolist's alternative of setting p, in this case the price of gold, and letting q, the quantity of government spending and lending, float. Taxes create demand for the currency. The government sets a price at which it will buy and sell gold, and makes all other purchases at market prices. It is then fiscally and monetarily constrained to a policy that spends little enough on non-gold items, and adjusts interest rates, to maintain a desired buffer stock of gold. The government must limit its non-gold spending to less than the demand for the currency created by taxation, so the excess demand for the currency is evidenced by gold sales to the government. Excessive non-gold spending results in gold sales to the private sector. As long as the buffer stock and legal convertibility are in place, the price of gold set by the government is the currency's value. All other prices float at market levels and reflect nominal value relative to the set price of gold.
Microeconomic theory details the logic, which concludes that a monopolist, controlling an absolute necessity, sets price, one way or another. The ELR proposal uses the option of setting one price, the ELR wage, paying market prices for other purchases, and letting the total quantity of government spending be market determined.
With a gold standard, gold can always be considered fully employed as gold can always be sold to the government at the fixed price. Likewise, with an ELR policy, labor can always find a buyer.

 The Paradigm Constraint

In no case must the government fund itself in dollars. Spending is limited by what is offered for sale, not by revenues. Taxes function to create a need for dollars, so the government can use dollars to purchase real goods and services. Borrowing functions to allow excess dollars created by deficit spending to earn a positive rate of interest. Deficits pose no funding risk since borrowing need take place only after spending, and only to support and maintain a desired interest rate. Interest rates and prices are subject to exogenous control by the issuer of the currency.
There is no evidence that government understands this paradigm. Government budgeting assumes the paradigm that dollars must be raised through taxing or borrowing to fund expenditures at market prices. The monopolist (the government) has decided to let market forces price its product (dollars). Therefore it must constrain the quantity of spending to maintain sufficient unemployment and excess capacity to prevent a decline in the value of its product (inflation).

Unemployment

Unemployment is defined as idle labor offered for sale with no buyers at that price. It will occur when the private sector, in aggregate, desires to work and earn the monetary unit of account, but doesn't desire to spend all it would earn if fully employed.
Post-Keynesian monetary theory reveals the essence of involuntary unemployment. Its term 'radical endogeneity' asserts all deposits are the accounting records of loans, and deposit money exists only in conjunction with outstanding bank loans. If, therefore, in the private sector one agent wishes to increase his holdings of net financial assets, H(nfa), this desire can only be satisfied by the reduction of another agent's holdings of H(nfa). An agent's net financial assets are reduced whenever either the agent increases its outstanding debt, or reduces its stock of financial assets. Net financial assets are increased by paying down debt or by increasing the current stock. In the absence of financial intervention by the government, if one agent desires employment in order to increase his holdings of financial assets, another must decide to reduce his net financial assets for a transaction to take place. If no agent is willing to reduce his net financial assets, the desired sale of labor does not occur. This is defined as involuntary unemployment.
The national accounting double entry bookkeeping system is always in balance. Entries on one side of the ledger must be accounted for with offsetting entries on the other. Investment, for example, is accounted for as savings in national income accounting, so, by definition, total investment will always equal total savings. Government deficit spending is classified as government dissaving, and the offsetting accounting entry is an increase in net private sector nominal savings. Thus, whenever the government engages in deficit spending, aggregate private sector H(nfa) is increased, with H(nfa) including offshore holdings of dollar denominated assets. Furthermore, the level of government deficit spending determines private sector H(nfa). Should the private sector desire to increase its H(nfa), this desire can be satisfied only by an increase in government deficit spending.
Unemployment can therefore be summarized as follows:
Involuntary unemployment is evidence that the desired H(nfa) of the private sector exceeds the actual H(nfa) allowed by government fiscal policy.
To be blunt, involuntary unemployment exists because the federal budget deficit is too small.
Furthermore, if an agent wants to sell any real goods, and thereby increase his H(nfa), this too can only be accommodated by another agent decreasing his H(nfa). If the desired H(nfa) is greater than the actual H(nfa), the evidence is involuntary inventory accumulation and a contractionary bias.

H(nfa), Aggregate Demand, and Aggregate Supply

The understanding that unemployment is evidence of the government deficit being too small is consistent with the standard concept of aggregate supply and demand. Aggregate demand is the sum of all expenditures, and aggregate supply is the sum of all goods and services offered for sale. It can then be stated that if the private sector wanted to use some of its full employment income obtained by selling real goods and services to be held as H(nfa), the evidence is some combination of involuntary inventory accumulation and involuntary unemployment. Involuntary unemployment is thus traced to a desired H(nfa) that exceeds actual H(nfa).
The aggregate supply and demand approach allows changes of desired H(nfa) to be expressed either as a change in aggregate demand or a change in aggregate supply. The H(nfa) approach focuses only on the control variable-desired H(nfa)- regardless of whether it is aggregate supply or aggregate demand that is excessive or deficient. In fact, it may always be impossible to distinguish a shortfall in aggregate demand from an excess aggregate supply, rendering the distinction unnecessary.

The $12,500 Price Constrained Incomes Policy

The proposed ELR policy and its version of full employment and price stability are a logical extension of the correct paradigm of a tax driven currency. Since the private sector needs the government's spending to pay taxes, government constraint of the size of the ELR wage, rather than constraint of the quantity of dollars it spends, results in a form of price stability. H(nfa) can be determined directly by the private sector as it decides the total quantity of ELR labor it sells to the public sector. The government sets the ELR wage and lets the market allocate all other resources accordingly. This is the same process that determines relative value under a gold standard. Under the ELR proposal, the government adjusts fiscal and monetary policy to maintain the ELR pool much the same way that a government adjusts fiscal and monetary policy to maintain a buffer stock of gold with a gold standard.
Price stability under an ELR policy is similar to that under an incomes policy. With an incomes policy, however, a budget is still targeted, so it is unlikely that actual H(nfa) will match desired H(nfa). Too small a deficit will result in unemployment. Too large a deficit will be inflationary and 1) reduce the relative standard of living of those subject to the incomes policy, 2) introduce incentives for violating the wage and productivity laws, and 3) in general, create an emotionally charged social debate that results in a series of politically determined solutions.
The ELR proposal establishes a minimum wage standard, as the government is willing to employ anyone at the ELR wage. It also provides a brake on private sector wage increases that are not related to productivity increases, as employers have a pool of government ELR workers from which they can draw. Also, employees recognize that ELR workers may replace them, though the cost to the employer will depend on the qualifications and training necessary to perform the task the employer desires. In this way, a nominal wage scale emerges. The value of the currency is the ELR wage, since that is what the government, the monopoly supplier of its money, has decided it will pay. Other wages are subject to market forces.
The initial ELR wage can be set at any level as market forces will align all other wages and prices. To minimize disruption, an initial ELR wage should be one that is not so high as to draw workers away from the private sector, and not so low as to require a general deflation to bring actual H(nfa) in line with desired H(nfa). For example, if the ELR wage were set high enough to attract workers from the private sector, a one-time adjustment would take place. Net government spending would rise as the ELR workers were added to the government payroll. Private sector output would decline as workers left their jobs, and private sector income would rise from the higher paying ELR jobs. Businesses would then have to pay more, both to replace lost workers and to retain their other workers. Prices would rise as both costs and incomes were being pushed up. The converse holds if the ELR wage is set too low. This would be evidenced by a slowdown in sales as private sector income was insufficient to realize a desired H(nfa) and purchase the output of business. Increasing inventories would lead to layoffs and downward pressure on the price of labor. Eventually, more workers would find their way to ELR jobs and government spending would rise. At some point prices would stabilize in line with the ELR wage. $12,500 per year was selected as the ELR wage for this proposal. This is a bit higher than the current minimum wage and might result in a small one time upward adjustment in the price level. My bias was to err slightly on the high side, rather than risk an initial deflation.
Under the ELR program, changes in desired H(nfa) result in, and are evidenced by, equal changes in actual H(nfa). For example, if the private sector desire for H(nfa) increases, involuntary unemployment that would occur in the absence of an ELR policy will, instead, result in additional labor being sold to the government for $12,500 per year. This increases government spending and the deficit, allowing actual H(nfa) to increase to the level desired by the private sector. In other words, if the deficit increases by $50 billion, that number, by definition, matches the private sector's desire to net save financial assets. The currency, meanwhile, remains defined by the labor that can be purchased for $12,500. Furthermore, not providing the desired H(nfa), and letting unemployment remain at current levels, would define a deflationary and contractionary bias.
Conversely, if desired H(nfa) decreases, perhaps due to increased non-ELR government spending or behavioral changes in the private sector, an opposite bias is introduced. The government will begin to lose its $12,500 workers to higher paying jobs in the private sector. This reduces government spending. It could also increase tax liabilities, further reducing net spending. H(nfa) is thereby reduced, until it matches the H(nfa) desired by the private sector. If fiscal policy is such that all of the $12,500 government workers are hired by the private sector, then the market price of ELR labor has risen beyond $12,500, and the currency has been redefined downward accordingly. It is the equivalent of the government losing its buffer stock of gold under a gold standard. Additionally, unlike gold, non-homogeneous labor means that as the pool of ELR workers shrinks, the remaining ELR workers would be increasingly less valuable to the private sector, and the currency may begin to get redefined downward at an increasing rate. Indeed, if the remaining ELR workers have no value to the private sector, continued shrinkage of the ELR pool may be impossible, and government spending increases or tax cuts designed to reduce the size of the ELR pool might result only in a devaluation of the currency. To regain control of prices, the government could act to offset the reduced desired private sector H(nfa) directly and restore the ELR pool to a desired level by cutting spending or raising taxes. It could also attempt to indirectly raise desired H(nfa), by changing interest rates; introducing tax advantaged savings plans, etc. Such efforts would be designed to trigger a deflationary private sector slowdown that would result in a reduced demand for private sector workers above the $12,500 ELR wage, and workers finding their way back to the $12,500 ELR payroll. If this were deemed too disruptive, the same fiscal constraint could be matched with an increase of the ELR wage, say, to $15,000 per year. This would redefine the currency downward to that level- presumably the perceived market level that wages had gone to at that time. Prices would stabilize around the new benchmark as desired H(nfa) and actual H(nfa) correspond to a desired buffer stock of $15,000 ELR workers. The question of the appropriate size of this pool of workers would be somewhat analogous to the current debate over the current natural rate of unemployment.
The ELR can be considered a labor standard policy that continuously defines the value of a dollar by the quality of ELR labor that can be hired at a given price. Since labor is not homogeneous, the value of the dollar will, by definition, fluctuate with the quality of the labor that $12,500 purchases. This carries an implied cyclical tendency towards increasing money value during periods of private sector increases in desired H(nfa), and vice versa. For example, layoffs in the private sector would result in additional $12,500 government workers of higher quality than the existing pool. This would enhance the investment environment for foreigners as well as domestics, as better workers could be hired for the same nominal wage. Also, any increase in the attractiveness of the ELR pool, such as a higher level of education, would both increase the purchasing power of the currency and increase the value of the currency in the foreign exchange markets. A well thought out ELR plan would include a well-organized program to educate, upgrade skills, and make productive use of ELR workers.
This type of fluctuation of the quality of the labor available for $12,500 technically constitutes price instability, as the currency is being constantly redefined at the margin by the quality of the best worker in the pool. This does not, however, necessarily represent an increase in price volatility of goods and services over the current system which uses a pool of unemployed, i.e., the concept of a natural rate of unemployment, to stabilize prices. Nor does it imply that the resulting price instability due, for example, to an increase in the general level of education, is undesirable.
Defining the dollar by the ELR labor that can be purchased at the margin does not mean all prices will be constant forever. To the contrary, all other prices, including asset prices, will be constantly changing as the market allocates via price. Only one price, the ELR wage, has been used to define the currency. All other prices result as the forces of supply and demand settle on nominal prices that reflect a value relative to the ELR wage and continuous full employment.
Most proposed incomes policies extend government regulation into the private sector, requiring, for example, documentation that wage increases not exceed productivity increases. The proposed ELR program, however, recognizes that it is only necessary to constrain the prices the government, itself, pays. By allowing the private sector to realize desired H(nfa) through the market process, market forces will link wages to productivity. For example, an available-for-hire pool of ELR workers means private sector employers will not be forced by shortages of unskilled labor to increase wages. More productive employees will be able to command a higher wage, though general productivity increases by business will not result in higher wages if a given job can be performed equally well by a $12,500 ELR worker.
This program does not necessarily defeat the real business or inventory cycle. It does use the proposed $12,500 public service job to absorb fluctuations of private sector employment, allowing the private sector to achieve its desired H(nfa) on a continuous basis. This neutralizes any monetary system bias implied currently by a government policy that does not allow actual H(nfa) to match desired H(nfa).

ELR V.S. Unemployment Compensation

The value of a currency is determined by what the government demands the private sector must do or sell to obtain it. Unemployment compensation is payment for not working. If everyone could simply stay home and collect a government check, not be stigmatized, and thereby obtain all currency necessary to pay all taxes due, the currency would have no value. Therefore, under current policy unemployment compensation must be limited, temporary, and an insufficient source of revenue for the private sector to meet its tax obligations and desired H(nfa).
The ELR program, on the other hand, requires the employee, at a minimum, to sell his time. The ELR program therefore need not be limited, as the currency will maintain its value regardless of the quantity of ELR spending. The value of the currency will equal the effort necessary to earn the ELR wage.

Past Attempts at Government Sponsored Full Employment

With a private sector desire for H(nfa), and a government that fails to run a deficit large enough to accommodate that desire, the corresponding unemployment can be severe. It may eventually be reduced by a reduction in desired H(nfa) because of lower interest rates, or, as some contend, by falling wages. However, the time necessary to test this hypothesis is usually beyond human tolerance, and the pragmatic view of government employment arises.
For example, from 1931 to 1941 unemployment averaged well over 10% - the definition of a depression. It hit a high of 24.9% in 1933, and was still 14.6% as late as 1940. GNP reached a high of $203.6 (billions of 1958 dollars) in 1929; fell to a low of $141.5 in 1933, and by 1939, had crept up only to $209.4. Low interest rates were not enough to decrease desired H(nfa). Short term Treasury securities reached a high of just over 5% in May of 1929, were cut to the mid 3% range in November 1929 following the stock market crash, and were as low as about 0.5% by September 1931. Rates were increased to about 2.5% until May of 1932, and then remained well under 1% until 1948. Continuous low interest rates also did not seem to result in run-away asset prices. The Dow equity index price did not recover to its 1929 highs until 1958, the 1927 highs were not reached until 1946, and the low of 1930 was not surpassed until 1936.
In 1933, after several years of undesirable unemployment and depressed GNP, the Public Works Administration, the first public works program, was enacted. It was followed by the WPA in 1935. It is noteworthy that these programs did not come about until after several years of troubling unemployment, and fell short of solving the unemployment crisis and ending the depression. Work relief never reached more than 40% of the unemployed, and only 3 million of the 9 million unemployed participated in the WPA. The reason these programs were constrained was the reluctance to engage in government deficit spending. During the 1930's, in spite of the high unemployment and depressed growth, budget balancing was never far from the forefront of political purpose. Belief in a balanced budget prevented government relief programs from ending the depression, and when Roosevelt honored his 1936 campaign pledge to balance the budget in 1937, the economy suffered a major setback with unemployment jumping back to 19.1% from a seven year low of 14.3%. Public works programs that were 'paid for' by other spending cuts or by tax increases could not reduce unemployment as there was never enough net government spending to accommodate desired H(nfa). The largest deficit of the 1930's was 5.9% of GNP in 1934, and it was down to 0.1% of GNP by 1938. The U.S. was on a gold standard, and policy had to include managing the national gold supply. This led to various extremes such as suspending domestic convertibility in 1934, and making it illegal for domestics to own gold, as well as strong support for balancing the federal budget.
During WWII, a radically different approach was initiated. Government spending exceeded tax collections in 1942, 1943,1944, and 1945 by 14.5%, 31.1%, 23.6%, and 22.4% of GNP respectively. Unemployment was under 2% by 1943, and output increased from $209.4 (billions of 1958 dollars) to $337.1 by 1943. Prices were fixed, and government planning agents from the Office of Price Administration enacted rationing. Great effort was taken to ensure that rationing was perceived as equitable ensuring public support for the program. Patriotism kept Americans from black markets that may have otherwise drained resources needed for the war effort, and patriotism also became associated with nominal savings. The idea was to get desired H(nfa) up to the level of deficit spending in a low interest rate environment. In other words, hoarding of dollar denominated financial assets via government bond purchases was encouraged, allowing the government to purchase up to 60% of the real output without price competition from consumers. The desire of the American public to earn money and not spend it, which caused the unemployment of the previous decade, now dovetailed well with the public sector demands for war production, and unemployment was, for all practical purposes, eliminated.

 Foreign Trade

Transactions of real goods and services between those within the geographical confines of the U.S. and anyone outside the U.S. are generally defined as foreign trade. Exports are real goods and services leaving the country, and imports are real goods and services entering the country. By standard definition, exports are a real cost, and imports are a real benefit. Exports can be considered the cost of imports. Financial transactions are accounting information, and not considered as imports or exports.
The chronic U.S. trade deficit, for example, means the dollar price of imports continually exceeds the dollar price of exports. This puts increasing numbers of dollars in the hands of non-U.S. residents who have decided to hold dollar denominated financial assets rather than use their dollars to buy U.S. goods. This is an identity, for, if they did buy U.S. goods, there would not be a trade deficit. As holders of dollar denominated financial assets, they are net nominal savers, much like any domestic holder of dollar denominated financial assets. For purposes of this analysis, foreign dollar denominated financial holdings are considered part of H(nfa).
Currently, most of the world allows currencies to trade freely. Occasionally the major central banks will intervene in the foreign exchange markets, and buy or sell one currency versus another for a variety of reasons and motivations. However, most central banks are not legally bound to guarantee convertibility of their home currency to another currency at predetermined rates. Exceptions include a few currency board systems as Argentina and Hong Kong. Should a foreign holder of dollar denominated financial assets desire to switch to another currency, he must find, in the market place, another agent who wishes to be his counter party. If a transaction does occur, the dollar denominated financial assets will change hands but not increase or diminish. The exchange rate will likely fluctuate, but the quantity of dollar denominated financial assets remains unchanged. Dollar H(nfa) is not changed by foreign exchange transactions that do not involve the Federal Reserve acting for its own account.
The desired H(nfa) of the foreign sector is a factor since it is part of the total desired H(nfa). A declining dollar in the foreign exchange markets becomes indicative, again by definition, of decreasing desired H(nfa) of the foreign sector agents, and vice versa. The number of $12,500 public service employees under the ELR employment proposal will fluctuate with changes in the desired H(nfa) of the foreign sector as well as the domestic sector. It is total desired H(nfa) that controls the number of these public service workers. Increased government deficits that arise when the pool of $12,500 ELR workers increases always match the desired H(nfa) of the entire non-government sector. The dollar remains defined by the available workers, so changes in the value of the dollar in the foreign exchange markets must be a function of the quality of the ELR labor available for $12,500 and the changing value of the other currency.
This understanding allows policy makers the option of taking advantage of the benefits of being a net importer. For example, an increase in net imports that results in the loss of private domestic employment will immediately result in an increase in the number of government $12,500 workers. This increases government spending (and the budget deficit) which may result in other industries hiring workers away from the government. If the pool of $12,500 ELR workers is deemed by the electorate to be too large, taxes can be cut or public spending increased until the number drops to the desired level. The public would associate higher trade deficits with an increasing standard of living, lower taxes, and other such benefits.
A fixed exchange rate would present problems similar the gold standard since the gold standard is, for all practical purposes, a fixed exchange rate system. If the Federal Reserve was committed to convert dollars to other currencies, a larger budget deficit or trade deficit could result in the rapid depletion of the Fed's foreign currency reserves, forcing the suspension of convertibility and a return to a market system.

Interest Rates and Employment

Anyone who lives entirely on his interest income may otherwise need employment. Such rentiers have removed themselves from the labor force. To the extent that higher real rates increase the rentier population, potential output is reduced. Furthermore, those left working are, in real terms, supporting those living on interest income
The concept of scarce jobs has led to a variety of programs designed to reduce the work force to limit unemployment. These include child labor laws, education for veterans, aid for single mothers, and even social security. These programs were ultimately unsuccessful at reducing unemployment, no matter how many potential participants they eliminated, as a given percentage of unemployed became a tool to limit price and wage increases. The real result of reducing the labor force is reduced output.
Lower real interest rates will tend to keep more individuals in need of employment. Combined with a well run ELR policy, low rates should increase output dramatically with much of the increased output being investment. It may be possible, for example, to repair, rebuild, enhance and maintain the public infrastructure without a decrease in private consumption from current levels.

Conclusion

It is widely assumed that deficit spending to hire unemployed workers carries at least two risks- inflation and funding. The inflation risk comes from the failure to understand exogenous pricing. It is feared that deficit spending will cause an implied upward bias on labor costs from both the aggregate demand created by the deficit spending, and the elimination of the competition of the unemployed for available jobs. The result is an anti-inflation policy that requires excess capacity in the private sector to keep market prices from rising. This includes the need to maintain a pool of unemployed to discourage wages from rising. The second perceived risk, funding, comes from the widely held misconception that the government must be able to fund itself to carry on spending. The government is, therefore, concerned not only with how the market will receive the debt it believes it needs to sell in order to fund itself, but also concerned that there may be a market determined funding limit. Until these perceptions change, a pool of unemployed workers will be necessary to contain inflation, and deficit spending will be resisted.
The Keynesian mainstream proposes ending unemployment by increasing aggregate demand through low interest rates and increased deficit spending. To offset the inflation risk inherent in this policy many Keynesians propose various government legislated incomes policies. These require the direct government regulation of private sector wages, usually attempting to link wages with productivity. This has been rejected by the electorate, who seem to prefer the excess capacity approach to price stability.
The proposed ELR program recognizes that the government is a monopoly supplier of its currency. Price is set through the ELR wage, which defines the purchasing power of the currency. Further recognized is that deficit spending poses no financial solvency risk to the government.
The government, as employer of last resort, is not a new concept. What prevented such policies from being viable and sustainable in the past - the gold standard and other fixed exchange rate policies- are long gone. We currently have a monetary system that can accommodate both full employment and price stability on a permanent basis.
This ELR proposal is a logical extension of Keynesian and Post- Keynesian thought. Endogenous money is already deeply rooted, and the idea that an incomes policy need only be practiced by the government with its ELR wage should not pose any philosophical barriers. Nor should classical economists and their offspring be entirely against such an ELR program. If they are correct, there would eventually be an equilibrium condition with the ELR pool dwindling to 0.
Endnotes
The Author is a partner in the Investment Firm Adams, Viner and Mosler, and wishes to acknowledge the help of the following (alphabetical order):
Shannon Cox
Paul Davidson
Betty Rose Factor
Mathew Forstater
Charles Goodhart
Daniel Seymour
Pavlina Tcherneva
Frederick Thayer
L. Randall Wray

Warren B. Mosler
February 2, 1997